Abstract. All known round optimal (i.e., two-move) blind signature schemes either need a common reference string, rely on random oracles, or assume the hardness of some interactive assumption. At Eurocrypt 2010, Fischlin and Schröder showed that a broad class of three-move blind signature scheme cannot be instantiated in the standard model based on any non-interactive assumption. This puts forward the question if round optimal blind signature schemes exist in the standard model. Here, we give a positive answer presenting the first round optimal blind signature scheme that is secure in the standard model without any setup assumptions. Our solution does not need interactive assumptions.
Introduction
Blind signature schemes [Cha83, Cha84] provide the functionality of a carbon copy envelope: The user (receiver), puts his message into this envelope and hands it over to the signer (sender). The signer in return signs the envelope and gives it back to the user who uses the signed enelope to recover the original message together with a signature on it. The notion of security in this context entails (1) that the signer remains oblivious about the message (blindness), but at the same time, (2) the receiver cannot forge signatures for fresh messages (unforgeability).
Blind signatures are an important primitive, whose classical applications include e-cash, e-voting, and anonymous credentials [Bra00, CG08, BP10] . Moreover, oblivious transfer can be built from unique blind signatures [CNS07, FS09] . The several known instantiations of blind signature schemes are based on security assumptions either in the random oracle model [PS00, Abe01, BNPS03, Bol03, AO09, Rüc10], or in the standard model [CKW04, Oka06, HK07, KZ08, AFG + 10]. Constructions based on general assumptions are also known [JLO97, Fis06, HKKL07, FS09] . Recently, Katz, Schröder, and Yerukhimovich show that blind signature scheme cannot be build in a black-box way from one-way trapdoor permutations [KSY11] .
Although many blind signature schemes are known, all round optimal solutions (the user sends a single message to the signer and gets a single response) rely either on the random oracle heuristic [Cha84, Bol03] , or they require a common reference string [Fis06, AFG + 10, GS10, MSF10] , and some instantiations even prove their security under an interactive assumption [BNPS03, Bol03, GS10] . Recently, at Eurocrypt 2010, Fischlin and Schröder give a (partial) answer to the question why the construction of round optimal blind signatures without any setup assumption is very difficult [FS10] . In fact, the author show that three-move blind signature schemes with signature-derivation checks cannot be build from any non-interactive assumption in the standard model. A signature derivation-checks is a publicly verifiable test if the user is able to derive a valid signature or not. Interestingly, most of the round optimal blind signature schemes known today have this property [Cha84, Bol03, Fis06] . In particular, this means that there is no much hope to instantiate one of the known schemes under weaker assumptions.
Concurrently Secure Blind Signature Schemes Another reason why round optimal blind signature schemes are desirable is that a solution would be concurrently secure. Concurrently secure blind signature schemes, however, are difficult to obtain. Juels, Luby, and Ostrovsky [JLO97] explained why a straight forward approach does not work. The authors then present a solution that is, according to Hazay et al. [HKKL07] , only secure in the sequential setting. The reason is that the solution seems to require a concurrently secure protocol for two-party computation. Such a protocol, however, is a mayor open problem in the standard model [HKKL07] .
Obtaining a concurrently secure protocol under simulation-based definition via black-box proof is impossible as shown by Lindell [Lin03] . Previous protocols overcome this impossibility result by assuming a common reference string and by relying on game-based definitions. The only exception is the protocol of Hazay et al. [HKKL07] that does not need a CRS. The authors build a blind signature scheme that uses the concurrent zero-knowledge protocol of Prabhakaran, Rosen, and Sahai [PRS02] that has a logarithmically round complexity as a building block.
Our Contribution
Our main contribution is the first round optimal blind signature scheme in the standard. In contrast to prior schemes, our solution does not need any setup assumption such as a common reference string. Our construction is based on standard cryptographic assumptions and its security is not based on interactive assumption. Our solution can be considered interesting for at least the following reasons:
• Our construction is the first construction in the standard model that consists of only two moves.
• The scheme shows how to bypass the impossibility result of Fischlin and Schröder from Eurocrypt 2010 [FS10] . This is achieved by 1) building a scheme without signature-derivation checks and 2) using non black-box techniques.
• Our solution shades light onto build concurrently secure 2-party protocols. In particular, it shows that the known impossibility results for concurrently 2-party computation [Lin03, Lin04] can be bypassed by considering specific functionalities.
Our blind signature scheme is based on general assumption and can be instantiated under the assumption that exponential hard one-way functions, certified trapdoor permutations, exists and that the DDH assumption holds.
Notations. Before presenting our results we briefly recall some basic definitions. In what follows we denote by λ ∈ N the security parameter. We say that a function is negligible if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial. A function is non-negligible if it is not negligible. If S is a set, then x $ ← S indicates that x is chosen uniformly at random over S (which in particular assumes that S can be sampled efficiently). We write A(x; X) to indicate that A is an algorithm that takes as input a value x and uses randomness X. In general, we use capital letters for the randomness. W.l.o.g. we assume that X has bit length λ.
Blind Signatures and Their Security
To define blind signatures formally we introduce the following notation for interactive executions between algorithms X and Y. By (a, b) ← X (x), Y(y) we denote the joint execution of X and Y, where x is the private input of X and y defines the private input of Y. The private output of X equals a and the private output o Y is b.
Def inition 2.1 A blind signature scheme BS consists of PPT algorithms Gen, Vrfy along with interactive PPT algorithms S, U such that for any λ ∈ N:
• Gen(1 λ ) generates a key pair (sk, vk).
• The joint execution of S(sk) and U(vk, m), where m ∈ {0, 1} λ , generates an output σ for the user and no output for the signer. We write this as (⊥, σ) ← S(sk), U(vk, m) .
• Algorithm Vrfy(vk, m, σ) outputs a bit b.
We assume completeness i.e., for any m ∈ {0, 1} λ , and for (sk, vk) ← Gen(1 λ ), and σ output by U in the joint execution of S(sk) and U(vk, m), it holds that Vrfy(vk, m, σ) = 1 with overwhelming probability in λ ∈ N.
Note that it is always possible to sign messages of arbitrary length by applying a collision-resistant hash function to the message prior to signing. Blind signatures must satisfy two properties: unforgeability and blindness [JLO97, PS00] . For unforgeability we require that a user who runs k executions of the signature-issuing protocol should be unable to output k + 1 valid signatures on k + 1 distinct messages.
Def inition 2.2 Blind signature scheme BS = (Gen, S, U, Vrfy) is unforgeable if for any polynomial , the success probability of any PPT algorithm U * in the following game is negligible (in λ):
• Gen(1 λ ) outputs (ssk, svk), and U * is given svk.
• U * (svk) interacts concurrently with instances S 1 ssk , . . . , S ssk .
• U * outputs (m 1 , σ 1 , . . . , m +1 , σ +1 ). U * succeeds if the {m i } are distinct and Vrfy(svk, m i , σ i ) = 1 for all i.
The blindness condition says that it should be infeasible for any a malicious signer S * to decide which of two messages m 0 and m 1 has been signed first in two executions with an honest user U. This condition must hold, even if S * is allowed to choose the public key maliciously [ANN06] . If one of these executions has returned ⊥ then the signer is not informed about the other signature either.
Def inition 2.3 Blind signature scheme BS = (Gen, S, U, Vrfy) satisfies blindness if the advantage for any PPT algorithm S * in the following game is negligible (as a function of λ):
1. S * outputs an arbitrary public key svk along with two messages m 0 , m 1 . 2. A random bit b is chosen, and S * interacts concurrently with U b := U(svk, m b ) and Ub := U(svk, mb).
When U b , Ub have completed their executions, σ b , σb are defined as follows:
• If either U b or Ub abort, then (σ b , σb) := (⊥, ⊥).
• Otherwise, let σ 0 (resp. σ 1 ) be the output of U 0 (resp. U 1 ).
S * is given (σ 0 , σ 1 ).
3. Finally, S * outputs a bit b .
A blind signature scheme is secure if it is unforgeable and blind.
Signer S(ssk)
User U(svk, m) 
Towards a Secure Construction
The high-level idea of our construction is as follows (Figure 1 shows a simplified version of the signature issue protocol). The user first encrypts the message using a fully homomorphic encryption scheme and sends the ciphertext to the signer. The signer, in return, evaluates the signing circuit on the ciphertext and sends the result back. To recover the signature, the user simply decrypts the ciphertext. The basic idea of the protocol follows the (well known) approach of building secure two-party computation from a fully homomorphic encryption scheme. The resulting protocol, however, is only secure in the semi-honest setting. In the context of blind signatures we are interested in stronger security guarantees and now we describe which additional steps are required to obtain a fully secure blind signature scheme.
Key Generation. The first observation is that the user must generate the keys for the fully homomorphic encryption scheme, or the scheme cannot be blind. But if the user generates the key, then the scheme might be forgeable. The reason is that the forger might generate fake keys that may leak some parts of the circuit and thus of the signer's private key. To handle this issue we let the user append a proof that the keys are generated honestly. This proof, however, must not reveal any information about the decryption key nor about the encrypted message. The obvious way to handle this problem would be a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZK). Yet, since NIZKs (except in the ROM) require a common reference string, they are not applicable in our setting. Instead we rely on two-round witness-indistinguishable proofs, called ZAPs. These proofs have the interesting property that the first message can be fixed once and for all and used for several proofs. This property helps us preserve the round complexity by storing the first move of the ZAP in the public key. ZAPs, however, are "only" witness indistinguishable and not zero-knowledge. Therefore, we include as a second witness a pre-image of a one-way function (the image is stored in the public key). The ZAP then proves that the user either generated the key honestly and encrypted the message honestly, or that it knows the a pre-image of a one-way function.
Signing. The signer then validates the proof and is supposed to run the evaluation algorithm honestly using the right private key, or blindness might be violated. In particular, consider an adversary that first uses ssk 0 and afterwards ssk 1 as a signing key and that otherwise follows the protocol honestly. The attacker would receive both signatures and could easily break blindness. In order to guarantee that the signer computes all steps honestly, we let the signer append a second ZAP. This ZAP then proves that it "signed" the contained message honestly using the right private key. Again, since the ZAP is only witness-indistinguishable, we use as a second witness a second pre-image of a one-way function. The first message of the ZAP and the image of the one-way function for this proof is part of the user's first protocol message. Again, the round complexity is preserved.
Achieving Unforgeability. To show that the protocol is unforgeable, several more modifications are necessary.
The overall idea is to reduce the unforgeability to the unforgeability of the underlying signature scheme.
To do so, we construct an adversary B against the unforgeability of the signature scheme that simulates the protocol execution for the forger of the blind signature scheme. The difficulty in this proof is that B has to submit a "real" message to its external signing oracle and hence needs to find out which message is contained in the ciphertext sent by the user. Since ZAPs are only witness-indistinguishable (and no proof of knowledge) the extraction of the message from the ZAP is not possible. We solve this issue by applying a complexity leveraging argument. Loosely speaking, this technique says that some primitive A cannot be broken in polynomial time but can be broken in time T (λ) for some super-polynomial function T , while a second primitive B cannot be broken in time T (λ). Concretely, we assume that the signature scheme is unforgeable w.r.t. time T 2 and our attacker B runs in time T 1 < T 2 . In the protocol, we let the user commit to the message (in addition to the encryption) using a commitment scheme that it extractable in time T 1 . Our attacker B then extract the message from the commitment and sends it to the signing oracle and encrypts the obtained signature. In this step, we need an additional property of the fully homomorphic encryption scheme that is called circuit privacy. Roughly speaking, this property says that it is not possible to distinguish between a ciphertext that has been computed by applying the evaluation algorithm to the ciphertext, or by applying the circuit to the message and then encrypting the result.
Achieving Blindness. The above-mentioned modifications are not yet sufficient to achieve blindness. Recall that blindness means that the malicious signer cannot distinguish the order of two signature issue protocols. In order to formally prove blindness, we have to show that the transcript (i.e., the messages exchanged between the signer and the user) is computationally independent of the message to be signed. We achieve this in two main steps. First, we let the signer commit to its private key. Second, we apply another complexity leveraging argument to extract the private key and the pre-image out of the commitments. Recall that the ZAP from the user to the signer proves that he has encrypted the messages honestly, or that he know the pre-image of a one-way function. Since we now know the second witness, we let the user send an encryption of an all zero string to the malicious signer. Since the fully homomorphic encryption is IND-CPA it follows that this modification does not change the success probability of the adversary. In the last step of the proof, we let the user sign its message locally with the previously extracted private key. Since the transcript is now independent of the message, it follows that the scheme is blind.
Needed Primitives
Before presenting our generic construction, we review the required primitives.
One-Way Functions. The standard notion of one-wayness of functions is defined as follows. Let A be an adversary and define OW-advantage for a function f :
Def inition 4.1 A function f is T -one-way if Adv ow f,A is negligible for any PPT algorithm A running in time T · poly(λ).
We need in our proofs that the function is invertible after a certain time.
Def inition 4.2 A function f : {0, 1} λ → {0, 1} λ is invertible in time T , if there exists an algorithm A that gets as input an image y ← f (x), with x ∈ {0, 1} λ , runs in time T · poly(λ), and outputs x such that x = x with overwhelming probability.
Moreover, we assume that f has efficiently decidable images. That is, for all values y ∈ {0, 1} λ there exists a PPT algorithm A that outputs 1 iff y is an image of f with overwhelming probability. We write this as y ∈ image(f ).
Pseudorandom Functions. Loosely speaking, a function f is pseudorandom if no PPT adversary can distinguish it from a random function. More precisely, a function F R : {0, 1} λ → {0, 1} λ is T -pseudorandom if for all adversaries A running in time T · poly(λ) there exists a negligible function negl(λ) such that
where R ← {0, 1} λ is chosen uniformly at random and f is chosen uniformly at random from the set of functions mapping λ-bit strings to λ-bit strings.
Non-interactive Commitment Scheme. A commitment scheme consists of a pair of efficient algorithms C = (Com, Open) where: Com takes as input m ∈ {0, 1} λ and outputs (decom, com) ← Com(m), where decom and com are both of length {0, 1} λ ; the algorithm Open(decom, com) outputs a message m or ⊥ if c is not a valid commitment to any message. It is assumed that the commitment scheme is complete, i.e., for any message m ∈ {0, 1} λ and (decom, com) ← Com(ck, m), we have Open(ck, decom, Com(ck, m)) = m with overwhelming probability in λ ∈ N.
Commitment schemes must satisfy two properties: hiding and binding. Hinding means that no adversary can distinguish which of two messages are locked in the commitment. Let A be a non-uniform adversary against C and define its hiding-advantage as In addition to these requirements we assume that the commitment scheme is extractable in superpolynomial time T , i.e., there exists an algorithm that gets as input a commitment and outputs the contained message. More formally:
Def inition 4.3 C is T -hiding if the advantage function Adv
Def inition 4.5 A commitment scheme C is extractable in time T ,if there exists an algorithm A running in time T · poly(λ) such that for any com, decom with Open(com, decom) = m = ⊥, we have A(com) = m with overwhelming probability.
Signature Scheme. A signature scheme Sig = (SigGen, Sign, SigVrfy) is a tuple of algorithms: SigGen(1 λ ) outputs a key-pair (ssk, svk); the algorithm Sign(ssk, m) takes as input a signing key ssk, a message m ∈ {0, 1} λ and outputs signature σ; the verification algorithm SigVrfy(svk, m, σ) outputs 1 iff σ is a signature on m under svk. We assume completeness i.e., for any message m ∈ {0, 1} λ , and key pair (ssk, svk) ← SigGen(1 λ ) and σ ← Sign(ssk, m) we have SigVrfy(svk, m, σ) = 1 with overwhelming probability in λ ∈ N. The security of signature schemes is proven against existential forgery under adaptive chosen message attacks (EU-CMA) [GMR88] . Let A be an adversary against Sig and define its eu-cma-advantage as
The adversary A is not allowed to query Sign(ssk, ·) about m * .
Def inition 4.6 Sig is T -eu-cma-secure if the advantage function Adv cma Sig,A is a negligible function in λ for all adversaries A running in time T · poly(λ).
ZAP.
A ZAP is a 2-round witness-indistinguishable proof [DN07] (with negligible soundness error) with the useful property that the first round (a message from verifier V to prover P) can be made universal for all executions and therefore be part of the public key of V. More formally: Let L p(λ) := L ∩ {0, 1} ≤p(λ) for some polynomial p. A ZAP is 2-round public coin witness-indistinguishable protocol for some N P-language L with associated relation R L . It consists of two efficient interactive algorithms P, V such that:
• The verifier V(1 λ ) outputs an initial message msg;
• The prover P(1 λ , msg, w) gets as input msg, a statement s ∈ L p(λ) , and a witness w such that (s, w) ∈ R L ; it outputs a proof π;
• The verifier V(msg, s, π) outputs a decision bit b.
A ZAP is complete if for any (s, w) ∈ R L , we have V(msg, s, P(msg, s, w)) = 1 with overwhelming probability. ZAPs must satisfy adaptive soundness and witness indistinguishability.
Def inition 4.7 A ZAP satisfies adaptive soundness if for any (unbounded) algorithm P * the following is negligible:
Def inition 4.8 A ZAP is non-uniform computationally witness indistinguishable if the advantage of any non-uniform PPT adversary A in the following game is negligible:
, and two sequences w 0 1 , . . . , w 0 and
2. A random bit b is chosen.
3. Compute π i ← P(1 λ , msg, s i , w b i ) for all i, and give these to A.
Dwork and Naor showed that ZAPs can be build upon any certified trapdoor permutation [DN07] .
Size-Dependent Homomorphic PKE. [BHHI10] Roughly speaking, a size-dependent homomorphic public-key encryption scheme is a fully homomorphic encryption scheme with the relaxation that the ciphertext may grow. More precisely, a size-dependent homomorphic public-key encryption scheme PKE = (EncGen, Enc, Dec, Eval) consists of a key generation algorithm (ek, dk) ← EncGen(1 λ ); an encryption algorithm c ← Enc(ek, m) that, upon input a public key ek and a message m, outputs a ciphertext c; a decryption algorithm m ← Dec(dk, c) that, upon input the private key and a ciphertext c, returns the message m. The algorithm Eval takes as input a public key ek, a circuit C, and a ciphertext c and outputs another ciphertext c . The scheme PKE = (EncGen, Enc, Dec, Eval) is perfectly correct for a given circuit C if, for any plaintext m, and key-pair (ek, dk) ← EncGen(1 λ ), and ciphertext c with c ← Enc(ek, m) it is the case that Dec(dk, Eval(ek, C, c)) = C(m) with probability 1. Now, we define weak function-privacy [BHHI10] . This property says that the adversary cannot distinguish which circuit has been used for the evaluation as long as the output of two circuits are the same (even if the adversary knows the private decryption key). More formally, we say that PKE is non-uniformly computationally weak function-private for all m ∈ {0, 1} λ , all circuits C 1 , C 2 with
We define CPA security as usual. Let A be an adversary against PKE and define its IND-CPA-advantage as
We require that |m 0 | = |m 1 | and st is some arbitrary state information.
Def inition 4.9 (IND-CPA) PKE is IND-CPA secure if the advantage function A cpa PKE,A is a negligible function in λ for all non-uniform computational adversaries A.
Overview About the Primitives. Fix two superpolynomial functions T 1 and T 2 such that T 2 > T 1 . In our construction, we assume two one-way functions f s and f u , a pseudorandom function F , two commitment schemes C M , C R , a signature scheme Sig, two ZAPs Z s , Z u , and a size-dependent encryption scheme Enc. We will assume that these schemes satisfy the following conditions: Condition 1. For the correctness we assume that Sig is complete; Enc is correct; C M and C R are complete; Z s and Z u are complete.
Condition 2. For the proof of unforgeability we assume that -f s is T 2 -one-way; -f u is invertible in time T 2 and has efficiently decidable images; -F is a T 2 -pseudorandom function; -Enc is non-uniformly computationally weak function-private; -Sig is T 2 unforgeable; -C M is non-uniformly hiding, perfectly binding, and extractable in time T 1 ; -C R is T 2 -hiding, perfectly binding; -ZAP Z s is adaptively sound;
-ZAP Z u is non-uniformly computationally witness-indistinguishable.
Condition 3. For the proof of blindness we assume that -f s has efficiently decidable images; -f u is T 1 -oneway; -Enc is perfectly correct and non-uniformly IND-CPA secure; -C M is extractable in time T 1 and non-uniformly hiding; -C R is perfectly binding; -ZAP Z s is non-uniformly computationally witness-indistinguishable; -ZAP Z u is adaptively sound.
Instantiability. In what follows, we discuss which standard assumptions Condition 1,2, and 3 can be instantiated. Firstly, to instantiate f s , f u we need to assume that exponential hard one-way functions exist. The perfectly binding commitment schemes C M , C R can be build from any one-way permutation. Signature scheme exist under the assumption that one-way function exist. The size-dependent homomorphic public-key encryption scheme can be instantiate under the DDH assumption [BHHI10] . We stress that this is a strictly weaker assumption than the existence of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme. ZAPs can be build from any certified trapdoor permutation [DN07] .
Construction and Security Proofs
In this section, we define our construction and show that it is unforgeable and blind.
Construction
We define our blind signature scheme through the following algorithms:
Key Generation. Gen(1 λ ) peforms the following steps:
Signing. The protocol for U to obtain a signature on message m is as follows:
• U picks four random values K, E, M, X u each of bit length λ. It generates a key-pair of the encryption scheme (ek, dk) ← EncGen(1 λ ; K), encrypts the message c ← Enc(ek, m; E), and commits to the message com m ← Com M (m; M ). It then computes com x u ← Com M (0 λ ; X u ) and a proof π s (with respect to msg s ) for the ZAP Z s that (y s , ek, c, com m , com x u ) ∈ L s , where L s contains tuples for which there exists either a witness ω s 1 = (K, E, M, m, dk) such that
or there exists a witness ω s 2 = (x s , X u ) such that
Notice that in L s , inside com x u we have the value x s . This is due to the fact that com x u is the commitment produced by U which is supposed to show that U knows the value x s produced by S.
• U generates the challenge for the ZAP Z u . It picks x u ← {0, 1} λ uniformly at random, sets y u ← f u (x u ), and computes the first message of the ZAP Z u as msg u ← V u (1 λ ). It then sends (ek, c, π s , com m , com x u , msg u , y u ) to S.
• S receives (ek, c, π s , com m , com x u , msg u , y u ) from the user; it first verifies that π s is a valid proof (with respect to msg s ) (y s , ek, c, com m , com x u ) ∈ L s and that y u is a valid image of f u . If either of the checks fail, S aborts. Let C := C ssk,R (m) be the circuit computing Sign(ssk, m; F R (m)). Otherwise, if both condition hold, then S picks two random values V, X s each of bit length λ and it signs the message contained in c by running c ← Eval(ek, C, c; V ) and computes the commitment com x s ← Com M (0 λ ; X s ). It then computes a proof π u (with respect to msg u ) for the statement (svk, com R , c, c , ek, com x s , y u ) ∈ L u , where L u contains tuples for which there exists either a witness ω u 1 = (R, S, T, V, ssk) such that:
or there exists a witness ω u 2 = (x u , X s ) such that
S then sends (c , π u , com x s ) to U.
• U verifies that π u is a valid proof (with respect to msg u ) w.r.t. the ZAP Z u for the statement (svk, com R , C, c, c , ek, com x s , y u ) ∈ L u . If this proof fails, then U aborts. Otherwise, it computes the signature σ ← Dec(dk, c ) and outputs σ.
Verification. Vrfy(vk, σ, m) returns SigVrfy(svk, σ, m).
Security Proofs
We show that the above defined construction is complete, unforgeable, and blind. Within all proofs, we assume that T 1 < T 2 .
Proof of Unforgeability. The proof idea is the following. We start with a game that corresponds to the unforgeability game of blind signatures and we then gradually change this game such that at the end we can build an adversary against the unforgeability of the underlying signature scheme. The main steps of the proof are the following:
• We apply a complexity leveraging argument. This technique allows us to invert the one-way function f u and also to extract the message m out of the second commitment com m .
• We use the external signing oracle in the unforgeability game of the underlying signature scheme to sign the message m.
Signer S(sk)
User U(vk, m)
//encrypt and commit c ← Enc(ek, m; E) to the message • Instead of applying the evaluation algorithm Eval, we directly encrypt the obtained signature using the size-dependent homomorphic encryption scheme. These modifications do not change the success probability of the adversary (against the unforgeability of the blind signature scheme) because:
-the size-dependent homomorphic encryption scheme is weakly function-private and thus, the attacker cannot tell the difference;
-the ZAP remains valid as it now uses the previously computed preimage x u of f u as a witness.
Theorem 5.1 Suppose that f s , f u , and F are function, C M , C R two commitment schemes, Sig a signature scheme, Z s , Z u two ZAPs, and Enc size-dependent encryption scheme such that all primitives satisfy Condition 1. Then the blind signature scheme as defined in Section 5.1 is unforgeable.
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that the above construction is not unforgeable. Then, there exists a PPT algorithm U * that outputs ( + 1) message/signature pairs (m i , σ i ) after executions of the signature issue protocols. This adversary wins if all messages are distinct and all signatures verify. Now, consider the following sequence of games, where the first game Game 0 is the unforgeability game in which we run the game with the forger U * . Within all games, the first line number is the number of the game (i.e., line 107 in Game 1 corresponds to 007 in Game 0). (com m i ) we denote the function that extract the committed value according to Definition 4.5. Analogously, f u i −1 (y s ) is the algorithm that inverts the one-way function f u according to Definition 4.2. Both algorithm are running in time T 1 . To show that the adversary's success probability in both games is the same (except for a negligible fraction) we have exploit the non-uniform hiding property of the commitment. The difficulty is that step 106a cannot be computed efficiently. Nevertheless, we solve this issue applying the following (standard) technique. The idea is to consider an attacker against the commitment scheme that is computationally unbounded, as long as it
has not received the commitment. Once the attacker has obtained the commitment, it runs in polynomial time. More precisely is the following lemma:
Lemma 5.2 Let C be a non-uniformly hiding commitment scheme and A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an adversary such that A 1 is computationally unbounded and A 2 runs in polynomial time. Then, the probability that A wins the following game is negligible:
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that A = (A 1 , A 2 ) is an adversary that wins the above game with non-negligible probability. Then there exists a worst-case random tape for A (for any security parameter) such that A with that random tape wins the game with non-negligible probability. We now apply an averaging argument. Let m 0 , m 1 be the messages that A 1 returns given this random tape and denote by st the returned state. Now, let A 2 be the second adversary that has this state hardcoded into its circuit. Note that A 2 is a non-uniform adversary that runs in polynomial-time. Now, A 2 can clearly predict the bit b and thus wins the game with non-negligible probability. This, however, contradicts the assumption that C is non-uniformly hiding.
Lemma 5.2 allows us to perform a computation that is not feasible in polynomial time before seeing the commitment. During this step, we extract the message out of the commitment m i ← Com . preimage with overwhelming probability. Then, we commit to x u i (instead of 0 λ ). Note that this is only possible because step 119 happens after step 116. This, however, is not quite true because this step happens in a loop. Thus, at some point step 119 happens before step 116. To handle this issue, we refine our argument as follows: let Game1 i be the game where we made the substitution during the first i runs but not in iterations i + 1, . . . , . Now, the same argument as above shows that Game1 i and Game1 i+1 are indistinguishable for any i (even if i depends on the security parameter). This, however, also implies that Game1 0 and Game1 are indistinguishable. Furthermore Game1 0 = Game 0 and Game1 = Game 1, hence Game 0 ≈ Game 1 where ≈ indicates that the probability that both games output 1 is the same (except for a negligible amount).
Game 1 ⇒ Game 2 ⇒ Game 3. In the next game, Game 2, we first change the witness of the ZAP Z u . That is, we use as a witness the pre-image x u i of the one-way function f u that we have inverted in the previous step. Afterwards, in Game 3, we sign the message that was extracted in Game 1, we run the evaluation algorithm on the circuit C σ i that outputs the constant value σ i . C σ i can be assumed to have the same size as C ssk,R by padding.
Now, we argue that both modifications do not change the success probability of the adversary U * by more than a negligible amount and therefore, Game 0 ≈ Game 3. This should follow from the following two observations
• The one-way function f u has efficiently decidable images and the signer checks if y u i is a valid image under f u in step 007. Thus, according to our construction the witness x u is a valid. Note that according to our construction the witness w u i := (R, S, T, V i , ssk) used in Game 1 is also valid. Since both witnesses are a valid witness and because we have assumed that the ZAP Z u is non-uniformly witness-indistinguishable, it follows that the success probability of U * in both games is the same (except for a negligible amount).
• The size-dependent homomorphic encryption scheme is non-uniformly weakly function-private. Thus, the adversary U * does not notice the difference in the computation of c i .
Unfortunately, we cannot apply both arguments directly. The reason is that these arguments are only applicable as long as the games run in polynomial time. In the previous step, however, we have inverted the one-way function and we have extracted the message from the commitment. Both steps, however, are not computable in polynomial time. We handle this issue by carefully applying a hybrid argument. The second difficulty results from the fact that the ciphertext may not contain the message that we have extracted from the commitment. In this case, the success probability of the adversary U * would change as it would notice the difference after receiving the encrypted signature. We handle this problem by derving a contradiction to the soundness of the ZAP and the one-wayness of the function f s . Firstly, we prove that the message in the commitment and the encryption are the same. Then, we apply the hybrid argument.
We now apply carefully a hybrid argument over all three games:
Game 1 i : Perform the following modifications:
-For all iterations < i apply all changes from Game 1, 2, and 3.
-In iterations i on apply the modification from Game 1.
-For all iterations > i apply no changes (thus, it corresponds to Game 0).
Game 2 i Apply the following changes: -For all iterations < i apply all changes from Game 1, 2, and 3.
-In iterations i on apply the modification from Game 1 and 2.
Game 3 i Do the following modifications: -For all iterations < i apply all changes from Game 1, 2, and 3.
-In iterations i on apply the modification from Game 1, 2, and 3.
Now we argue that
Game 3 (i−1) ≈ Game 1 i : Follows as the only difference between both games are the modifications in Game 1 during the first execution.
Game 1 i ≈ Game 2 i : Follows from our assumption that the ZAP Z u is non-uniformly witness indistinguishable.
Game 2 i ≈ Game 3 i : The difference between Game 2 i and Game 3 i is that in the i-th iteration, in Game 3 i we replace c i ← Eval(ek i , C ssk,R , c i ; 308a) . Assume for the moment that the following fact ( * ) holds with overwhelming probability: If line 208 is reached, then there exists a dk i such that (ek i , dk i ) is in the range of EncGen(1 λ ) and
Then non-uniform weak circuit privacy implies that Eval(ek i , C ssk,R , c i ; V i ) and Eval(ek i , C σ i , c i ; V i ) are non-uniformly computationally indistinguishable. Since in Game 2 i and Game 3 i , after line 208 and 308, respectively, only polynomial-time computations occur, this implies that
It is left to show that ( * ) holds with overwhelming probability. Observe that line 208 is only reached when V s (msg s i , s s i , π s i ) = 1. Thus from the adaptive soundness of Z s it follows that s s i ∈ L s with overwhelming probability when line 208 is reached. Assume that s s i has a witness of the form (x s , X u ) with non-negligible probability. Then with non-negligible probability, there are x , X such that com x u = Com M (x ; X ) and f s (x ) = y s . This leads to a contradiction: From Game 2 i we can construct a non-uniform adversary that breaks the non-uniform T 2 -one-wayness of f s as follows: Upon input of a challenge y, it simulates Game 2 i , using y for y s (instead of x ← f (x s )). Then the adversary extract x from com x u . With non-negligible probability f (x ) = y 2 = y. Extracting x takes time T 1 · poly(λ) since C M is extractable in time T 1 . Similarly, the operations introduced in line 106a take time T 2 · poly(λ) since f u is invertible in time T 2 and C M is extractable in time T 1 . Thus we have constructed an adversary that runs in time T 2 · poly(λ) and breaks the one-wayness of f s . This contradicts the T 2 -one-wayness of f s . Thus a witness (x s , X u ) for s s i exists only with negligible probability. Since with overwhelming probability, when line 208 is reached, s s i ∈ L s . By definition of L s , this implies that there is a witness of the form (K, E, M, m, dk) for s s i . Hence (dk, ek i ) = EncGen(1 λ ; K) and c = Enc(ek i , m; E) and
Since C is perfectly binding and since m i was extracted from com m i we have m = m i . Hence ( * ) holds with overwhelming probability. Thus Game 2 i ≈ Game 3 i . Thus, Game 3 (i−1) ≈ Game 3 i and therefore Game 3 0 ≈ Game 3 . Since Game 0 = Game 3 0 and because Game 3 = Game 3, it follows that Game 0 ≈ Game 3 .
Game 3 ⇒ Game 4. This game is identical to the prior one, but instead of committing to R and ssk, we commit to an all zero string. Since the commitment scheme C R is T 2 hiding, this modification changes the success
probability of U * only by a negligible amount and thus, Game 3 ≈ Game 4 and therefore Game 0 ≈ Game 4.
Game 4 ⇒ Game 5. In this game, we do not generate the sining key locally, but we build a forger B against the signature scheme Sig. The difference to the above described games is that it uses its external signing oracle in order to obtain the signature σ i on the message m i . Here SigGen and Sign constitute a signing oracle.
SigGen produces a verification key and Sign signs messages, but whenever a message is submitted that was already signed, Sign returns the previously produced signature again.
Since F is a T 2 -pseudorandom function, and since R and S are used in Game 4 only in the arguments of SigGen and Sign, it follows that Game 4 ≈ Game 5 and thus Game 0 ≈ Game 5. Now, assume that the adversary U * wins the unforgeability game with non-negligible probability. Then, since Game 0 ≈ Game 5, U * also wins with non-negligible in Game 5.
Then it returns + 1 pairs (m i , σ i ) such that m i = m j for all i = j and SigVrfy(vk, m i , σ i ) = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , + 1. We denote by Q = (m 1 , . . . , m ) the set of messages that have been asked to the external signing oracle Sign. Since all messages are distinct there exists at least one message m j ∈ Q. The forger B outputs (m j , σ j ). Since SigVrfy(vk, m i , σ i ) = 1 for all i, we have in particular that the pair (m j , σ j ) verifies and thus B succeeds with non-negligible probability. Since B runs in time T 2 · poly(λ), this contradicts the assumption that Sig is T 2 -unforgeable. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Blindness. We sketch the main idea of the blindness proof and give a formal proof afterwards. The starting point of our proof is a game that corresponds to the blindness game. We then change the step by step such that at the entire transcript is independent of the message. The main steps in the proof are the following:
• We apply a complexity leveraging argument. This technique allows us to invert the one-way function f s and also to extract the (R, ssk) from the commitment com R .
• We then send the encryption of an all zero string to the signer and we sign the message locally using ssk.
We show that the success probability of the adversary against the blindness remains the same (except for a negligible amount) because:
• the ZAP Z s remains valid as it now uses the previously computed preimage x s of f s as a witness.
• the size-dependent homomorphic encryption scheme is CPA secure and thus, the attacker cannot tell the difference;
Our modifications, however, result in a protocol where the transcript is independent of the message. This implies that the success probability of the adversary is only negligible bigger than 1/2.
Theorem 5.3 Suppose that f s , f u , and F are functions, C M , C R two commitment schemes, Sig a signature scheme, Z s , Z u two ZAPs, and Enc size-dependent homomorphic encryption scheme such that all primitives satisfy Condition 3. Then the blind signature scheme as defined in Section 5.1 is blind.
Proof. We prove this theorem via a sequence of games. It is understood that the adversary S * keeps some state during the blindness experiment. The first game Game 0 corresponds to the blindness game.
Game 0 ⇒ Game 1. Game 1 is identical to Game 0 except for the following modifications. In
Step 101a we invert the one-way function f s and we then commit to the preimage x s (instead of 0 λ ). Obviously, the
inversion of the one-way function f s cannot be done efficiently. This operation, however, is possible applying Lemma 5.2 and the fact that the commitment scheme C M is non-uniformly hiding. Recall that Lemma 5.2 shows that every non-uniform hiding commitment scheme preserves this property even is the adversary may perform an unbounded computation before receiving the commitment. Observe that the game aborts if the y s is not a valid image and assume in the following that y s is a valid image of f s . But if y s is a valid image, then we obtain a valid preimage x s . Since C M is non-uniformly hiding, it follows that Game 0 ≈ Game 1.
Game 1 ⇒ Game 2. Game 2 differs from Game 1 in the step where the user computes the proof π s of the ZAP Z s . In this game, we use the previously extracted preimage x s of the one-way function f s as a witness. It follows from our construction that both witnesses w s i are valid in game Game 1. Moreover, as discussed in the previous game, the value x s is a valid preimage of y s and thus it is an alternative witness for the ZAP Z s . Since the ZAP Z s is non-uniformly witness-indistinguishable it follows that the success probability of the adversary S * remains the same (except for a negligible amount). Thus, Game 2 ≈ Game 3.
Game 2 ⇒ Game 3. In this game, we modify the way we compute the commitment com m . That is, instead of committing to the message m i , we commit to 0 λ . According to our assumption that the commitment scheme is non-uniformly hiding, it follows this modification changes the success probability of S * only by a negligible amount, and thus, Game 2 ≈ Game 3.
Game 3 ⇒ Game 4. This game is identical to the prior one, but in this game we extract the values R and ssk from the commitment com R . Since R and ssk are never used and Com R −1 has no side-effects, Game 4 ⇒ Game 5. In this game, instead of decrypting c i to get the signature σ i , we instead just sign the extracted message m i .
Assume for the moment that the following fact ( * ) holds with overwhelming probability: If the assignment σ i ← Sign(ssk, m i ; F R (m i )) in line 514 is reached, then there exist values R i , ssk i such that (svk, ssk i ) is the range SigGen(1 λ ) and c i is the range of Eval(ek i , C R,ssk , c i ) and com R in the range of Com R ((R i , ssk i )). Then, since C R is perfectly binding, Com (com R ) returns (R, ssk) = (R i , ssk i ). By the perfect correctness of Enc and the definition of C R,ssk , this implies that computing Dec(dk i , c i ) and Sign(ssk, m i ; F R (m i )) yields the same result. Thus, if ( * ) holds with overwhelming probability, Game 4 ≈ Game 5.
It is left to show that ( * ) holds with overwhelming probability. Observe that the assignment σ i ← Sign(ssk, m i ; F R (m i )) is only reached when V u (msg u , s u , π u i ) = 1. Thus, from the adaptive soundness of Z u it follows that s u i ∈ L u with overwhelming probability. Assume that s u i has a witness of the form (x u , X s ) with non-negligible probability. Then with non-negligible probability, there are x , X such that com x s = Com M (x ; X ) and f u (x ) = y u i . This leads to a contradiction: From Game 5 we can construct a non-uniform adversary that breaks the non-uniform T 2 -one-wayness of f u as follows: Upon input of a challenge y, it simulates Game 5, using y for y u i (instead of y u i ← f (x u i )). Then the adversary extracts x from com x s such that with non-negligible probability f u (x ) = y u i . Extracting x takes time T 1 · poly(λ) since C M is extractable in time T 1 . Notice, however, that the steps introduced in lines 101a and 401b may take exponential time. However, these steps occur before the y = y u i is first accessed. Thus we have constructed an adversary that first runs an unbounded amount of time, then inputs the challenge y, and then runs in time T 1 · poly(λ) and finds a preimage of y under f u with non-negligible probability. Since the result of the unbounded precomputation can be hardcoded into a non-uniform adversary (analogous to Lemma 5.2), such an adversary breaks the T 1 -one-wayness of f u . Thus ( * ) holds with overwhelming probability.
It follows Game 4 ≈ Game 5. non-uniform IND-CPA security of Enc it follows that Game 5 ≈ Game 6. It follows Game 0 ≈ Game 6. It is easy to see that in Game 6, the view of S * is independent of b. (The signatures σ i do not depend on the values sent by S * .) Thus in Game 6, the probability that S * guesses b = b is 1 2 . Hence in Game 6, that probability is negligibly close to 1 2 . Thus our blind signature scheme satisfies blindness.
